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The driving thesis behind this study is to place the formation of Korean Chaebols
squarely in the 1950s, corresponding directly with the outbreak and conduct of the
Korean War. The Korean War provided enough new market demand for the
emersion of Korea’s Chaebols. During and after the War, disposal of ex-Japanese
enterprises, relief funds, government reserved dollar allocations and bank finance
loans provided the grounds for the formation of Chaebols. This study emphasizes
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Ⅰ. Introduction: The Origins of Korean Chaebols in a Historical
Perspective
The Korean War destroyed Korea’s industrial foundation and paralyzed the nation’s
economic policy. The War, however, also provided for new entrepreneurial enterprises,
namely the catalyst for the coming on the scene of Korean Chaebols. The driving thesis
behind this work is to place the formation of Korean Chaebols squarely in the 1950s,
corresponding directly with the outbreak and conduct of the Korean War. This contrasts
with a wide swath of literature arguing that the Korean Chaebols were largely a
continuation on earlier works and infrastructures, social and physical, held over from
the Japanese colonial era.1)
1) For concurring arguments on the continuity thesis, see Carter J. Eckert, Offspring of Empire:
The Koch’ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876-1945 (Seattle and
London: University of Washington Press, 1991); Bruce Cummings, The Origins of the Korean
War 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1981); Dennis L. McNamara, The Colonial Origins of Korean Enterprises, 1910-
1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Satoru Nakamura and Byung-jik Ahn,
Chosen Kinndaino Keizakouzo [Economic Structure of Modern Korea] (Tokyo: Nipponn
Hyoronnsa, 1990); Atu Kohli, “Where does High Growth Political Economics Come From? The
Japanese Lineage of Korea’s Developmental State,”World Development, vol.22, No.9
(September, 1994); and Seok-kon Cho, “Sutalronkwa Keundaehwaronul Numeoseo [Beyond the
Usurpation and Modernization],”Chanjakkwa Beepyung [Creating and Critique], vol.96
(Summer, 1997). And for opposing views, see Stephen Haggard, David Kang and Chung-in
Moon, “Japanese Colonialism and Korean Development: A Critique,”World Development, vol.25,
No.6 (June, 1997); Hong-yung Lee, “Mi Hakkei Oryu Beepan [Critique on the U.S. Interpretation
about Japanese-Colonialism],”Shindonga [Dong-A Monthly] (November, 1997); and Tae-hun
Chung, “Sutalronui Sokryuhwasoke Sarajin Shikminji [Vanishing Colony in the Debate of Vulgar
Usurpation],”Chanjakkwa Beepyung [Creating and Critique], vol.97 (Fall, 1997).
strategies and abilities to utilize and maximize productivity. It substantiates, from
case studies, that contrary to conventional wisdom, political factors are neither the
sole nor majority cause for the growth of these Chaebols; rather, their growth
owes largely to government’s economic policies and their economic strategy and
market adaptability. In short, the emergence of Korean Chaebols originates in the
1950s in the War’s aftermath. And the developmental trajectory of Chaebols is
characterized by an economic factor- pulled continuity rather than a political
factor-pushed discontinuity.
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Substantive research into 1950s Korea industry and the formation of industrial firms
is wanting. Researchers looking into the early 1950s have tended to focus on the
destruction of the Korean economy during the Korean War and then continued their
research with the development of the Korean economy after the 1960s.  
For comparative purposes, research correlating the effects of the Korean War shares
similar characteristic assumptions, namely: 1) the emergence of Korean Chaebols was a
passive venture, hinging largely on the Chaebols collusion with the Liberal Party of
President Syngman Rhee and the breakdown and disposal of ex-Japanese colonial
enterprises; 2) from the continuity thesis of the Japanese colonization, the period of
1950s are largely ignored in the developmental trajectory of Korean Chaebols and 3)
with respects to the relations between the Syngman Rhee administration and the United
States (US), the US’role in the Korean economy often is overemphasized without a
empirical analysis on role of Korean sovereign state.2)
These working assumptions, however, are limited with respects to analyzing the
formation of Chaebols, after the War, as Chaebols business’behavior was characteristically
active, for lack of a better word. To begin, since Korean Chaebols got their business
starts in international trade and manufacturing, it is hard to facilitate the argument
that these enterprises were simply extensions of enterprises spawned in the Japanese
colonial era. As such, we must turn to Korea’s domestic political economy for answers,
namely the Syngman Rhee administration’s policies and relations with the US
government, for Chaebols continuously sought out opportunities arising from the
tension and cooperation between the two countries.
I will first look at the size and scope of the War’s destruction as well as the new
market demands and business opportunities arising from the destruction. As this
research will evidence, Chaebols started to form precisely in the sectors where demand
was the highest. I also will take into account the disposal of ex-Japanese enterprises,
US economic assistance and analyze Korea’s exchange rate policy and inflation levels in
regards to the flow of wealth among the enterprises. Accordingly, I will analyze
Syngman Rhee’s administrative policies, which made such flows possible, to explain the
rise and fall of Chaebols. Finally, we will categorize the development of Chaebols by
type using case studies into the 1950s.
For data collection, we relied on legal documents from Korea’s Ministry of Finance,
documents on the accumulation of wealth from the documents by Park Chung-hee’s
military junta,3) historical records of banks and Chaebols, memories by relevant actors,
2) The US government helped to regulate the exchanged rates and dollar aid through Korea-
U.S. Combined Economic Board.
US diplomatic documents (Foreign Relations of United States), and other research
sources on the 1950s.4)
Ⅱ. New Demand and Business Practice during the Korean War
Most of Korea’s industrial facilities were damaged or destroyed during the Korean
War. The Korean economy fell into a state of paralysis as a result. In the first 3 months
after North Korea’s invasion, industrial complexes centered in areas of Seoul, Kyung-
gi, and Kangwon province were damaged heavily. Table 1 gives amounts of the damage
to Korean industries as of August 1951.
Printing facilities suffered the most damage with 75% being damaged to one extent or
another. In terms of total amount of damages, textiles suffered the most, losing about
$93 million along with 64% of facilities damaged. In sum, all 7 industries suffered nearly
close $115 million in destruction and damage, and loss of raw materials and products.
These figures, however, do not account for smaller factories that were unaccounted for
so the figure is most likely higher.5) In November 1950, there was a plan to move all
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3) Military Junta, Kunsahyeokmyeongsa [History of Military Revolutions] (1963); Military Junta,
Kunsahyeokmyeong Jaepansa [History of Legal Cases Concerning Military Revolutions] (1962).
4) There are many difficulties regarding data collection on this topic. Therefore, this study is
limited to reliance on data from the previous research papers: Lee Dae-Keun, Korean War and
the Capital Accumulation of 1950s (Ggachi, 1987); Kong Jae-Wook, 1950’s Korean Capitalist
(Baeksan Seodang, 1993); Kim Ki-Won, Economic Structure in times of US military governance:
Focus on ex-Japanese Enterprises’Actions and Voluntary Labor Rights Movement (Pureunsan,
1990); Kim Yang-hwa, “Capital Accumulation in 1950’s Manufacturing Industry”, Economy and
Society (Spring 1991); Kim Dong-Wook, “1940s-1950s Korean Inflation and Stabilization,”PhD
Dissertation, Department of Economics, Yonsei University (1994).
<Table 1> Damaged Manufacturing Industries (as of August 1951)






















Source : Korea Development Bank, History of Korean Industry and Economy for Ten Years (1945-
1955), pp.996-997
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industrial complexes to Jeju Island and other southern parts of Korea; but since the
damage caused when the North attacked Seoul was so quick and complete, the plan was
never realized.  
Still, while it is accurate to say that the War caused extensive damage to particular
industries and businesses, the heaviest damage was inflicted within the first 3 months
of the War’s outbreak. At this time, many businesses were ex-Japanese enterprises,
which had yet to be disposed of after Korea’s independence from Japan (August 1945).
In December 1949, The Korean National Assembly passed and put into place the “Act on
Ex-Japanese Assets;”6) but, public purchases of these assets were still considerably low
prior to the cease-fire agreement—as of March 1953 only 21 thousand among a total of
292 thousand (or 7% percent) of these enterprises had their assets disposed.7)
Naturally, the War drastically affected Korea’s macro-economy. There were large runs
on bank savings, and the amount of currency in circulation was increased to help
finance military expenditures. Worse still, prices increased rapidly owing to
transportation and logistic difficulties, destruction of manufacturing lines, paralysis in
the distribution of goods and services, and sharp drops in production and circulation.
Notably, the price of consumer products like food and clothing sky rocketed. As table 2
illustrates, the amount currency in circulation rose by 11 times between December 1948
and December 1951; retail prices rose by 15 times during the same period; and, rice
prices rose by 17 times. Increases in the amount of currency in circulation after the
start of the War were not invested in production but led directly to cornering and
hoarding of consumer products and caused price inflation. Additionally, funds from the
US went to cover labor costs and consumer goods purchases, deteriorating
macroeconomic conditions further.
5) According to ECA studies, in October 1950, it would require at least $46 million to recover
Korea’s manufacturing industries back to the pre-war conditions. Korea Development Bank,
History of Korean Industry and Economy for Ten Years (1945-1955), pp.180-181.
6) Disposal of ex-Japanese enterprises was put into practice through out the war to stabilize
inflation caused by the lack of goods, through sales to civilian of ex-Japanese enterprises to
encourage industrial complexes to produce goods for war related causes.
7) Ministry of Finance and Economy, Reflection of banking and finance: The Achievement for
Ten Years Since the National Foundation (1958), pp.166-167.
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Conversely, this destruction and inflation created new demand in the market.
Companies produced and manufactured according to this new demand. The government’s
reconstruction policies, and with it development funds, were aimed at restoring the
industry heaviest hit from the War, in this case the textile industry. This policy line, in
turn, created new business opportunities. During and after the War, sharp increase of
the “three whites: cotton, sugar, mill”demands served as foundation in Chaebols’rapid
growth. 
During the War, normal business operation was impossible. To begin, most factories
were destroyed, and it was difficult start new businesses. While it also holds that there
was not enough business in practice at this time to sustain chaebol’s growth. The
disposal of ex-Japanese assets, for example, which served as the central foundation for
Chaebols, was done largely post 1952. Additionally, economic aid, an auxiliary
foundation for Chaebols growth, was done after 1954. Hence, it is hyperbole to argue
that Chaebols fully emerged during the War. That is not to argue, however, that there
was not rapid growth in war-related industries. Demand for penicillin, medical
products, rice, and house-ware goods soared during the War, and with them so to the
enterprises active in their manufacturing. Enterprises in these sectors, however, are not
considered chaebols in the fullest sense of the word. Take, for example, the case of
Kyungbang, Ltd., whose total sales neared 394 million Won in 1949 and increased to 3.3
billion Won in 1952. Kyungbang, Ltd, like many other large enterprises, lost a cotton
mill in Youngdeungpo-District, a dye house in Siheung, a clothing factory in Ssangrim-
dong, and a silk mill in Uijeongbu in the earlier stages of the War. Kyungbang, Ltd
reconstructed their cotton mill in Youngdeungpo-District only after South Korea
regained control of Seoul. The Anyang factory of Kyungbang, Ltd also was destroyed
after accidental bombing from friendly US forces. Kyungbang, Ltd relocated raw cotton
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Source : Kim Dong-Wook, “1940s-1950s Korean Inflation and Stabilization,”Ph.D. Dissertation,
Department of Economics, Yonsei University (1994), p.124
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not damaged by the bombing to Daegu, constructing a machinery dye house also in
Daegu that opened for full operation in the fall of 1953. It was not until in October 1953,
after the related nations had signed the armistice, that Kyungbang, Ltd completed its
first reconstruction plan with the support of UNKRA.8)
Turning the focus to the Samsung Corporation, which was restarted as Samsung
Corporation Ltd. in 1951, Samsung was designated as a foreign currency loan recipient
by the Bank of Korea, importing sugar and fertilizer. In January 1952, Samsung
increased the amounts up to 6 billion Won, roughly twenty times what it was in 1951,
with net profits totaling 2 billion Won. This spike in investments and income owes
largely to a lack of supply and increased demand from the War. However, considering
Samsung’s other subsidiaries, Cheil Sugar and Cheil Industries’established year, June
1953 and September 1954, respectively, the foundation of Samsung as a genuine
manufacturing company dates only after the War.9) By way of example in the
construction industry, Joongang Industry and Hyundai Construction are excellent
examples of companies that flourished from the War. They grew fast from domestic
orders to build up the nation’s infrastructure and housing as well as taking orders from
US force in Korea. As we can see from Hyundai construction’s Han River bridge
restoration in 1957, they, too, emerged when the War was over. The Korean War
therefore, served as the defining condition for Chaebols’emergence.
Ⅲ. Economic Events and the Formation of Chaebols after the
Korean War
1. Disposal of ex-Japanese enterprises and state-owned assets
The disposal of ex-Japanese enterprises along with land reform became the driving
factor for the transfer of wealth from landlords to capitalists; thus signaling the fall of
the landlords.10) The disposal of ex-Japanese assets, which began in 1946, peaked
between 1951 through 1953, the time of War. Approximately 53.2% (1,097 cases out of
2,061) of the total disposals were done during this period. The size of ex-Japanese
8) Kyungbang Inc. Kyungbang Seventy Years (1989), pp.146-161. The Youngdeung-po factory
faced many difficulties in restoration due to occupation by British forces during the War. In
the case of Kyungsung Bangjik weaving machinery, nearly full recovery was possible by 1959.
9) Samsung Secretariat, 50 Years of Samsung (1988), pp.105-113.
10) Refer to Kim, Ki-won (1990), for the disposal of ex-Japanese assets by US forces and the
results and characteristics of land reform.
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assets, however, varies by case; therefore, it is crucial to identify how, when, and to
whom the ex-Japanese assets were disposed to better understand the origin and rise of
this new capitalist class. State-owned enterprises like Chosun Textile, Korea Textile
Industry, Buksam Chemicals, Samhwa Steels, and Tongyang Textile were disposed
between 1955 and 1956. Table 3 lists the disposals of ex-Japanese assets in the textile
industry.
Except for a couple of companies like Kyungbang Ltd., most major companies in the
textile industry began as a result of disposal. And the entrepreneurs and businessman



























































































































Source : Kong Jae-wook, “Study of Korean Capitalists in the 1950s,”(Baek San Suh Dang, 1993), p.110.
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who took possession the disposed assets or management right of the companies are
representative of the new capitalist class.  
Bank privatization, furthermore, took place in 1957, which directly affected Chaebol
formation. The Savings Bank, Industrial Bank of Korea, Heungup Bank, Choheung
Bank, which were previously state-owned, were privatized, setting the ground for
increased shareholders’influence.11)
One of the main reasons those who took possession of ex-Japanese assets disposal
became the core of a new capitalist elite was the rock bottom price they paid for large
sums of capital stock and assets. During the War, the ruling government hastened
disposal of ex-Japanese assets to help finance war costs. After the War, due to the lack
of appropriate capitalists who wanted to participate in the bid, the government’s target
price for ex-Japanese assets did not meet the market price. Therefore, receiving
disposal itself was considered as a privilege. Additionally, considering the high inflation
rate at the time, the longer entrepreneurs took to pay the cost of acquiring these assets,
the lower the actual value the government would have received. The bigger the company
size, moreover, the larger the gap between the government’s targeted price and the
market price. 
Approximately 40% of major companies in 1950s were composed of the remains of ex-
Japanese assets.12) Suhl Kyung Dong (Daehan Textile), Baek Nakseung (Taechang
Textile), Kim Sunggon (Keumsung Textile), Park Dubyung (Tongyang Beers), and Kim
Jonghee (Korean Chemicals) are some of the people benefited from direct disposal. Lee
Yanggu (Tongyang Cement) and Chung Jaeho (Daejun Textile) are some of the capitalists
received through the third party. 
2. Allocation of Relief funds and Exchange Rate Marginal Profit
To receive relief funds from US was quite a privilege in Korea’s skewed wartime
economy. Inflation, monopoly, price differences, and exchange rate marginal profits
from the big difference between official and real rate set a ground for Chaebols. Relief
funds flew to mid to large companies, reinforcing their efforts to grow bigger. Notably,
companies that received US dollars from the Korean government made huge exchange
rate marginal profits and accumulated further capital by utilizing the dollars in trading.  
11) Lee Byung-Chul, “Hoamjajeon [Autobiography of Hoam]”(Chung Ang Daily, 1986), pp.89-91;
Han Gyu Hoon, “Silrok Hangukeunhaeng [A True Record of Bank of Korea]”(Maeil Economic
Daily, 1986), pp.215-216.
12) Kong Jae-Wook (1993), p.119.
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Although the Korean version of the Marshall Plan continued after the establishment
of the new government, it was in August 1953 when the relief funds started to flow in,
first under the auspices of the FOA (Foreign Operations Administration, which merged
to ICA (International Cooperation Administration) in 1955. Along with this, the UN
initiated aid from CRIK (Civil Relief in Korea) and UNKRA (United Nations Korea
Reconstruction Agency) was offered. The total amount Korea received from the
establishment of the new government until 1960 from the US and the UN was $2.963
billion. Among which $1.867 billion (63%) was provided for the reconstruction of Korea
after the cease-fire agreement. By 1957, the total amount increased by 54.7% of the
total amount of government budget (about 35.003 million Korean Hwan) when we apply
the official exchange rate to the equation ($1=500 Hwan).
During the War, CRIK relief funds went mainly to improve the livelihood of the people.
UNKRA relief was channeled to facilities for mining and manufacturing industries, and
FOA relief went largely towards industrial facilities and consumer goods, each 34% and
66%. In 1953, Korean Textile Industry Association allocated the UNKRA relief fund
totaling $2.8 million to the textile industry and imported 55,440 spinning machine,
which were distributed to Chonmam Textile, Daejon Textile, and Keumsung Textile.13)
13) Spinners & Weavers Association of Korea, Banghyeop Sasipnyeonsa [Forty Years of Spinners
& Weavers Association] (1987), p.332.
<Table 4> US Relief funds to Korea in the 1950s (unit: $1,000)





















































































Source : Bank of Korea, “Monthly Economic Statistics.”Author: Hong Sung Yu, “Korean Economy
Capital Accumulation Process,”(Asia Research Center, Korea University, 1964), p.278.
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Meanwhile, US$ 630,000 from UNKRA was allocated by Korean government to the
reconstruction of Samchuk Cement and US$150,000 was allocated in support for other
small and medium enterprises.14)
However, since from the mid-1950s US aid strategy toward Korea began to change
from industrial production-focused to consumer goods-focused. Consumer goods and
raw materials made up most of relief, mainly the ICA relief. The so-called “3 white
industries”started from the provided relief supplies. Raw cotton used in the textile
industries came mostly from US relief as well as raw sugar used in the sugar
manufacturing industries. There was a big price difference between governments
allocated relief goods and imported goods; companies who received the allocated relief
goods from the government rapidly grew.15) Daehan Yanghwae and Hankuk Glass, for
example, are successful cases of state-owned companies becoming conglomerates after
the infusion of relief funds.  Kim Sung Gon, who constructed Keumsung Textile factory
with UNKRA funds in 1954, recorded the following: 
The cotton yarn was unimaginably popular. The set amount was sold to the public at
an officially fixed price and the rest was up to Keumsung to freely charge for sale; the
price was calculated to have enough profit even at the officially fixed price. Therefore,
securing larger amounts to be freely priced would ensure higher profit.  Bank interest
was due in two years, however, due to the high inflation, repayment was of no difficulty.
Monetary profits were reinvested to enlarge the size the factory. Furthermore, the
postwar recovery was yet to be completed; thus, the demand for the textiles was
enormous, and if I could get into the military supply chain, demand would be
explosive.16)
The Korean government’s US dollar reserves held from UN loan repayments or from
revenues gained by exporting tungsten also served as important factors in the growth of
Chaebols. The exchange rate applied to civilian importers generally was the “official’
fixed exchange rate, which allowed many firms to reap huge marginal windfalls. 
There also is the case of entrepreneurs profiting after taking advantage of the
government’s loan policies. The government and state banks divided foreign exchange
loans into two types: 1) the first were allocated to wholesale and retail traders and
14) UNKRA, UNKRA Project, Monthly Report, No.24 (October 8, 1954).
15) Korean Development Bank, Research Department, Hanguksaneopgyeongjae Sipnyeonsa
[History of Korean Industry and Economy for Ten Years] (1955), p.526.
16) Seong-gok Foundation for Press and Culture, The life of Seong-gok, Kim Seong-gon (1995), p.122.
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industries demanding raw materials; 2) the second focused exclusively on the import of
capital goods. In both cases, loan amounts were rewarded using a formula including
historical export records and real rates of consumption for raw materials.17) The amounts
importer’s profited by taking advantage of the ‘special foreign currency loans’are listed
in table 5.
According to the records compiled by illegal accumulation observers under military
junta, which were in operation right after May 16, 1961, many companies accumulated
wealth by receiving government allocation. For example, Baek Namil’s Taechang Textile
received about $5.5 million in government allocation and Ham Changhee of Shinjin
Heungup received $1.04 million in government allocation.18)
3. The Role of the Korea Development Bank and Marginal Interest Rate Profits
Those Korean companies that received ex-Japanese enterprises after their disposal
still needed large sums of capital to reconstruct damaged factories in addition to that
being provided by the government’s reserves or relief funds. Most of the leftover
financial support came from counterpart funds for raw materials and industrial
reconstruction bonds.19) Loans from the KDB had comparably lower interest rates than
17) The Editorial Committee, Thirty Years of Banking and Finance (1978), p.47.
18) The Investigation Team for Illicit fortune, “Jajinshingojabyeoljaewon [Data on Voluntary
Reportings]”(1961). Kim Ki-won (1990), quoted from pp.295-299.


























































Source : Jung Ku-Hyun, “Growth Strategies and Management Structures for Korean Companies”
(Korean Chamber of Commerce 1987), p.70.
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market interest rates. Naturally, then, those companies with access to the KDB’s
coffers, e.g. those companies with a track record of doing business with the government
or those working in strategic industries, were benefiting from the low interest rate
policy. In the 1950s, private loan rates hovered near 10% monthly whereas parts of ICA
and UNKRA loans through KDB stood at 3% monthly. Near the end of 1957 moreover,
KDB’s industrial finance loan interest rates were skewed to favor companies borrowing
on a grand scale as well as those firms operating in target industries. This also served
as a catalyst for particular Chaebols to grow rapidly.20)
According to Kong Jae-Wook, in the 1950s, 44.9% of major manufacturing companies
received large loans from the KDB. As of April 1961, Daehan Heavy Industry had
received the most with 6.18 billion Won, and the top 40 companies received a total of
1.13 billion Won.21) Notably, major shareholders like Lee Byung-chul of Hanil Bank,
Chung Jaeho of Chaeil Bank, and Lee Jungrim of Seoul Bank, received more loans as
illustrated in table 6.
19) The Editorial Committee, The Ten Year History of Korea Development Bank (1964), pp.61-81.
20) Kong, Jae-wook (1993), p.147.
21) Kong, Jae-wook (1993), p.161.
<Table 6> Total loan amount and portions funded to 15 capitalists by 7 major banks
(unit: million Won, %)
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Loan financing by newly emerging Chaebols was particularly active between 1958
through 1960. This is thought to be because US financing aid to Korea declined
significantly as of 1957 and the companies turned to bank loans to satisfy operation
costs and investment funds. Moreover, a recession that started in 1958 led to declines in
sales; thus, companies had to increase their loan amounts from banks to fill financial
shortages.22) On the other hand, if we observe the disposal ex-Japanese assets
chronologically, in 1958 default payments totaled 4,113 cases (70% of total payment
22) In 1957, the Korean government tried to implement a policy to prohibit the increase in
currency circulation by banks to stabilize the financial market, however, on the contrary the
amount of loans by conglomerates increased. Kim Dong-wook (1994), pp.151-153.

























































































































































































Reference : The 7 major banks are KDB, Industrial Bank of Korea, Choheung Bank, Seoul Bank,
Hanil Bank, Chaeil Bank, and Agricultural Bank.
Source : The Investigation Team for Illicit Fortune, “Bujeongchukjae Teukjeongin Yungjasanghwang
[Financial Conditions of Specific Illicit Fortune Amassers]”(1961) Kong Jae-wook, “Research
on 1950s Korean Capitalists”(Baeksan Seodang, 1993), quoted from p.215.
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5,973 cases) and in terms of amount, default payment totaled nearly 53 million Won,
over one third of the total payment amount.23)
Ⅳ. National Economic Policy and Chaebols’Rent Seeking
1. Import Substitution Policy and Consumer Products Light Industry
Korean society was ripe for structural, economic, social and institutional
transformations, owing to the tremendous upheavals and aftermaths the War forced
upon Korea. Syngman Rhee’s government, sensing the opportunity, if not necessity, for
social changes, weakened the landlord classes’economic control through land reform,
meanwhile firmly maintaining economic and social policies fertile to fostering a new
capitalist class and self-owning farmers.  
His ruling Liberal Party had as one of their central principles this: “we shall protect
the rights of commoners and the interests of laborers and farmers from the potential
infringements by the landlord class.”24) Article 2 of the party’s platform states, “we
pledge the betterment of farmers and gender equality while overthrowing vestiges of
feudalism: classes and factions.”25) Some scholars have interpreted the grand, idealistic
sentiment in these articles simply as bulwarks for the Liberal Party against Korean
Democratic Party and Democratic People’s Party that were politically anti-Syngman
Rhee and embedded in the landlord class. Liberal Party was pursuing capitalism by
setting stable grounds to foster new capitalist.26)
Syngman Rhee’s government pursued an import substitution industrializing strategy,
utilizing US and UN relief funds for the bulk of import purchases. Raw materials and
funds for postwar recovery were invested in operation and expansion costs for
production facilities so as to meet domestic demands and import substitution effect. The
large majority of Korea’s chaebols accorded with the government’s import substitution
strategy, and, thus, focused their import substitution light industries to meet increasing
23) Kim Ki-won (1990), pp.301-302.
24) Central Election Management Committee, Daehanmingukjungdangsa [History of Political
Parties in Korea] (1968), p.165.
25) The Liberal Party, Achievements and Policies of the Liberal Party (1960), p.269.
26) Rhyu Sang -Young, “Structure and Characteristic of Liberal Party”Yonsei University
Graduate School, Womwooronjip [Journal of Graduate School], No.21 (1993), p.198. The Liberal
Party banned co-ownership and independent ownership of laborers, and strictly abided to the
principle of disposing assets to capitalists in the process of the disposal of enterprises, going
side by side with the collapse of the landed class through agricultural reform.
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domestic demand for consumer goods. Records of the government’s finance loan
distributions clearly reveal the ruling party’s penchant for import substitution policies.
From 1953 to 1960, 90% of the government’s finance loans were given to capitalist
activity in general and agricultural industry. Only by 1960 did the funds set for boosting
Korea’s exports top 1 billion Won, roughly 0.5% of the government’s development
funds.27) The general industry fund, which reached the most to 55.8%, was all for
fostering an import substitution strategy in the period from 1953 to 1960.  
US government, in Korea at that period, pursued short-term military and political
stability more rather than long-term economic stability, lacking any policy preferences
and strategies for promoting export and economic development. With this backdrop,
Most of relief aid and funds from US that came in during that time were primarily
military purposed ones. Hence, conflicts developed between the US, who advocated the
funds be used primarily for military purposes, and Syngman Rhee’s government, who
had siphoned large portions of the funds into off the Korean economic en masse. In
Taeshik, then the Minister of Finance of the Korea-U.S. Combined Economic Board,
said:
One of the sharpest conflicts between ROK and US was on the proportion issues
when dividing annual relief into consumption goods and production goods. I argued for
larger sums of money for facilities purchasing and factory construction, whereas the
US side argued for larger sum of money for consuming goods to expand accumulation
of counterpart funds. Because of such conflicts, meetings were, at times, suspended,
to let the parties cool down.28)
Song Insang, then the Minister of Reconstruction, also records Syngman Rhee’s
efforts and strategies to allocate more relief aid funds to economic recovery:  
We argued strongly to use this counterpart fund to revitalize the economy and to
build stable foundations for our economic structures. However, the US side stood firm
on the military finance only policy, arguing national budget expansion should proceed
through fiscal policy such as increasing taxes.29)
27) Korean Development Bank, Josawolbo [Research Monthly Review] (1946. 8), p.20.
28) Song, Insang, Memoirs of Yoonam Song Insang: Revival and Growth (21st Century Books,
1994), p.163.
29) Hankook Daily, “Reflection of Financial Sector”, No.8, pp.37-38.
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The US kept pressing for a devaluation of the Korean Won to hasten economic
stability, correct the distorted market and hinder rent seeking. Meanwhile, the Korean
government’s exchange rate policy was related directly to the import substitution
strategy and Chaebols’rent seeking. The government’s goal was to secure more dollars;
but, for Chaebols, keeping exchange rates artificially low enhanced their rent seeking.30)
Industries active in import substitution, therefore, prospered as a result of the
government’s exchange rate policy.31)
2. Liberal Party’s Dominance and Predatory Rent Seeking
The Chaebols’penchant for rent seeking went hand in hand with the political
dynamics of 1950’s.  The Liberal Party needed funds to support their political activities.
In return for providing the party with these funds, Chaebols sought enormous rents.
The Liberal Party had at its sole disposal funds from the disposal of ex-Japanese
enterprises, raw material sales, and fund allocations from the Korea Development
Bank.32) They put pressure on government organs to provide special treatments to new
capitalists. And, as has been observed in nearly all newly democratic, capitalist states,
this pressure, accompanied with active lobbying, increased dramatically in the periods
just before and after important elections. In opposition to the ‘overdeveloped state’
thesis, it is explained that the political society centered on Liberal Party became bloated
and pursued plundering rent seeking activity.33) According to Kim Hyunchul, then the
Minister of Finance, traders adhering with Liberal Party put pressure and lobby on
government organs to pursue their private interests, thus, Liberal Party’s influence was
effective and real in allocating financial.
It became imperative for a merchant’s success to cultivate strong ties with powerful
persons in political parties. For their part, politicians worked hand in hand with these
30) Donald Stone Macdonald, U.S.-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance: The
Twenty-Year Record, Boulder (San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), pp.248-273.
31) Gordon Tullock, the most prominent rent-seeking economics scholar, also concluded that
the Syngman Rhee government’s import substitution strategy and low exchange rate policy
was an archetypical regime for the growth of rent seeking.
32) Refer to the Supreme Committee for National Reconstruction (1963) pp.121-125, 465-477,
for Liberal Party’s corruption in mobilizing funds for election.
33) Chung-in Moon and Sang-young Rhyu, “Overdeveloped State and the Political Economy of
Development in the 1950s: A Reinterpretation,”Asian Perspective, Vol.23, No.1 (1999), pp.179-
203. After the mid-1950s, the Liberal Party was directly involved in policy decisions such as
government staffing, economics, and resource allocation. 
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people to obtain dollars from the Ministry of Finance. The US’continued pressure to
use dollar reserves dollar persuaded government to use some of the reserve dollar. The
Liberal Party, knowing this, strongly demanded the allotment of dollars along with a
public tender and a private contract. Eventually, due to the persistent demand from
Liberal Party, government agreed to decide on recipient with Liberal Party.34)
In this kind of political dynamics, it was so obvious that Kyungbang, Ltd., that had
strong ties with opposition party, was excluded from raw material or finance loan
distribution since Liberal Party was in constant surveillance on them. However, to some
conglomerates who were in good relation with Liberal Party like Lee Gibung, special
treatment was given and in return, they provided funds for political activity. But, by
1957, the US’relief to Korea changed from grants-in-aid to development loans with the
size of relief reduced significantly. Accordingly, the domestic economy went into a
recession and the rents available to the Liberal Party and Chaebols declined.  Moreover,
there were more facilities in competition for precious allotments of raw materials; and
the imbalance between production and consumption increased.35)
Ⅴ. The Rise and Fall of Chaebols in the 1950s: Factors and Patterns
During the War and after the cease-fire agreement, at least there were no Chaebols’
sinking from war destruction but only emerging from new business chances granted by
Korean War if only 1950s are considered. After the War, the disposal of ex-Japanese
enterprises, raw material distribution, and KDB’s finance loans served as grounds for
new capitalists to grow into Chaebols by the end of 1950s. The coming to power of the
Park Chung Hee regime hastened the demise and reemergence of some of these
companies throughout the 1960s and 1970s. But, the majority of these conglomerates
grew to become Korea’s representative Chaebols. Hence, we need to approach the
formation and growth of Korea’s Chaebols from a vantage point extending beyond the
1950s.  
Volumes have been written regarding the reasons why some chaebols have survived
until today and others are but a memory. As with most debates, this one too is divided
into differing camps. Some have chosen to connect rent seeking with survival while
34) Hankook Daily, “Reflection of the Financial Sector,”No.7, pp.389-390.
35) Kim Yang-hwa (1991), pp.155-192. Kim Yang-hwa interprets this as deepening of the risk
and monopoly of capital accumulation.
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others have focused on actual production and business activities. This thesis assumes
that rent-seeking behavior exists in all periods and, therefore, put more emphasis on
whether companies’long-term objectives meet actual production and sales figures,
rather than focusing only on rent seeking behavior. In detail, two specific questions
must be answered to bring this debate to a definitive conclusion: 1) were relief funds
after the War invested according to the market demand; and 2) was this investment
successful in creating profits that could then lead to long-term survival?  
Unfortunately, the extant documents regarding production activities in the 1950s are
sparse at best. For example, there are records of how much loans companies received;
but, it is hard to trace the utility of these loans to see what was produced and how much
profit or performance was generated. This chapter, then, will outline the history of
some Korean chaebols. The list of companies was chosen owing to the quality of records
still existing on these companies and their particular experiences with rapid growth.
From this, we can glean a better understanding of the factors that played into processes
of the Chaebols’growth, and collapse as well as offer a historical perspective on the
‘continuity/ discontinuity’debate.  
1. Kyungbang Ltd.
Kyungbang Ltd. has existed from the Japanese colonial era to today.36) Kyungbang
Ltd. is an archetypical case of a chaebol experiencing economic “ups and downs”solely
as a result of politics. In the 1950s, the Liberal Party opposed the expansion of the
company, suspecting Kyungbang Ltd. was supporting the opposition party (Korean
Democratic Party). Kim Yeonsu of Kyungbang Ltd. never took over any disposed ex-
Japanese enterprises, and the KDB’s finance loans to the company were minute in
comparison to other firms in the same industry. However, right after 5.16 military coup
in 1961 they were able to continue with business activity because they were regarded
persecuted in Liberal Party’s ruling period.37)
On the other hand, Kyungbang Ltd. received US relief goods by pressuring the Korean
government when they froze any financial support in 1950s, along side with the US
government. In fact, Kyungbang Ltd. could not secure any raw cotton. They purchased
raw cotton with loans; however, after speculation that the firm was supporting the
opposition party, the Syngman Rhee government and bank’s coffers dried up. Then CEO
36) Carter J. Eckert (1991).
37) The Committee to Commemorate Dong-eun, Dong-eun, Kim Yonghwan (1979), pp.189-191.
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of Kyungbang Ltd. Kim Yonghwan’s repeated requests for loans from other agencies
including the Ministry of Finance and Korea Savings Bank failed. As a result, he was
forced to turn to US Diplomats - US special envoy to Korea Clarence E. Meyer and
Ambassador John J. Muccio- on the ground in Seoul. The influence of these US
Diplomats led Colonel Rolen of the UNCAC (United Nations Civil Assistance Command)
to provide raw cotton to Kyungbang Ltd. with 9 months interest free.38)
2. Taechang Bangjik
With close ties to the Syngman Rhee government, Taechang Textiles grew to become
the first conglomerate to achieve chaebol status in 1950s.39) Baek Nakseung, owner of
Taechang Textiles, had intimate personal relations with Syngman Rhee dating back to
the to the US military government’s days in Korea. Mr. Baek was a large donor to
Syngman Rhee and his party. In return, Taechang Textiles received $5.5 million of
government reserves in the form of loans in May 1953. In 1956, the company took
control of the disposed assets of the ex-Japanese enterprise Korea Textile, which were
valued at Korean Won 820 million. Taechang Textiles also was the largest single
recipient of ‘privileged government loans,’with loan figures reaching into the Korean
Won 6. 5 billion range.”
Unfortunately for the company owners and their employees, Taechang Textiles simply
was not able to tread fiscal water after the changes in Korea’s political landscape
brought on by the 5.16 military coup is a typical case of collapse of chaebol due to the
political power change before and after 5.16 military coup. For example, while Korea
Textile succeeded in lease contract with Yonsei University Foundation, only with
Syngman Rhee’s request, they breached the contract with Yonsei University and
contracted with Baek Nakseung to become Taechang Textile.40)
However, even with these numerous privileges, textile exports did not meet
expectations and, subsequently, the company defaulted on its loan repayments. In May
1959 however, the KDB stripped the owners of the textile firm of right of management
owing to what the KDB cited as “failure in management.”According to Ministry of
Finance records, Taechang agreed to pay 20% of export if there is export revenue in
repayment of loan $5.5 million Taechang received in 1953 and monthly payment of 1.5
38) Kyungbang Inc. (1989), pp.153-155.
39) Park Byungyun, Chaebol and Politics (Hanguk Yangseo, 1982), pp.108-109.
40) The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, “History of Korean Military Revolution,
No.1”, 1963, p.123.
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billion Hwan if there is no export. Unfortunately, monthly average profit during the last
5 months until 1959 was only 4 million Hwan.41) On the other hand, Baek Nakseung and
his successor Baek Namil had provided 780 million Hwan as political fund.  This is a
failure case that Taechang Textile did not invest the resources in the actual production,
rather provided them as political rent to obtain more privileges; it was a very inefficient
rent seeking behavior. Eventually, Baek presented all their assets to the country when
they received notification of 1.2 billion Hwan as repayment by the military government
and completely collapsed. 
3. Samho Group
Jung Jaeho’s Samho Group was entitled to many of the same privileges as Taechang
Textiles owing to the owner’s close relationship with the Liberal Party. Jung Jaeho’s
business partner was Jung Sanghee, a member of national assembly of Liberal Party. 
Established in 1949, Jung Jaeho’s Samho Textiles received special loan in 195342) from
the government’s reserves amounting to $470 million. The Samho Group took control of
the assets of Daejun Textile National Corporation in 1951 and Chosun Textile Busan
factory in 1955 after the latter companies went out of business. With the combined
assets, Samho Group went on to become the nation’s largest textile chaebol. Of
interesting note, with the influence Jung Jaeho gained after receiving ex-Japanese
owned shares of Cheil Bank, Samho Group emerged as the largest debtor (approximately
8.47 billion KW) among all Chaebols. 
The Samho Group’s experience is case in point that the change in political regimes
with Park Chung Hee’s coup d’etat did not spell the end for Chaebols willing to “play
ball”with the new regime. In fact, if anything, the opposite was true. Park Chung Hee’s
economic development model centered on cultivating corporate-government ties and
supporting the efforts of Korea’s fledgling capitalist class. The resultant corporate
environment stressed government ties and rapid adaptation to changes in market
situations.
The Samho group’s participation in the civil consortium for fertilizer, for example,
netted the firm sizable profits. Jung Jaeho also was able to milk the government’s
coffers for approximately 360 million KW in illegal remittances. With the 1960s
41) Ministry of Finance, “Taechangsanup Jungbubul Jyngseo Daebucheol [Taechang Textiles
Government Bond Account]”(Doc. No: 77-207), Kong Jae-wook (1993), p.271.
42) The Spinners & Weavers Association of Korea, A Commemorative Book for the 10 years’
Anniversary of the Spinners & Weavers Association of Korea (1957), No.2, p.77.
recession in the textile industry, however, Samho was forced into KDB supervision and
was devastated by the more than 100% of exchange rate loss, incurred in the repayment
of $US 6 million-dollar facilities which they imported from Japan in 1964. Both Chosun
Textile (1967) and Samho Textile (1972) were liquidated after insolvency. And with the
country’s economic recession in the early 1960s and internal corporate failures to adapt
to changing industrial circumstances, the Samho Group collapsed at the end of the
1960s.
4. Hwashin Group
Park Heungshik’s Hwashin Group already was the largest corporation in Korea when
the Syngman Rhee regime took power, owing to the firm’s growth under the Japanese
colonial regime. The firm’s coziness with the Japanese imperial authority in Korea,
however, proved to be disadvantageous both socially and economically after Korea’s
liberation. 
Still, the Hwashin Group grew to join the ranks of the Chaebols in spite of the Rhee
government’s anti Japanese/anti-collaborator policy. In 1952, the group took ownership
of Heunghan Textiles after receiving Tongyang Textile’s Hakik factory. In 1955, they
received US $825 thousand as recovery aid from UNKRA as well as rebuilt Shinshin
Department Store. Along with this, Park Heungshik received one billion KW in loans
from commercial banks.
Like the Samho Group, the coming of the Park Chung Hee regime did not compromise
the Hwashin’s Group business standing; the Group actively engaged the military
government, submitting business proposals including a development plan for the Seoul
Youngdon (current Kanhgnam area) region.  
The primary reason Hwashin Group collapsed was not political but, rather, economic.
Firstly, in 1969, the KDB took possession of Heungwhan Chemical Textiles (recent
Wonjin Rayon), and sold it off at public auction. Heungwhan Chemical Textiles, which
the Hwashin Group owned, had stretched its finances beyond its means. The KDB,
subsequently, cancelled delivery of a 2 billion KW loan to the Group owing to the bank’s
finance stability policy. Secondly, Hwashin Electrics and Hwashin Sony, both established
in 1970s, suffered from the global oil shock and severe recession, hampering their
ability to compete with rival firms.43) Eventually, in October 1980, Hwashin Group
received notification of bankruptcy from Choheung Bank. 
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43) Park Changgyu, “At the Peak of the Reopening: A Success Story of Korean Companies”
(Singiwon, 1981), pp.499-525.
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In the final analysis, the Hwashin Group’s case makes the case for the primacy of
economics over politics in the doing and undoing of Korea’s Chaebols. The Hwashin
Group was able to survive political crises in Korea only to fail in the competitive
business environment in the 1980s.
5. Samsung Group
Lee Byung-chul’s Samsung Group is the representative case of chaebols continuing
from the post-Korea War. The Samsung Group grew in definitive phases: 1) through
extensive trade during the War; 2) through manufacturing goods after the War; and, 3)
from the 1960s on, through developing an avant garde product line. The Group has been
adjusting flexibly to the changing business environment since.
The Samsung Group differs from other Chaebols in that the Group established its
flagship firms, Cheil Jedang (1953) and Cheil Industries (1954), without having received
any ex-Japanese assets or enterprises. Moreover, in 1957, they became major
shareholders of Hanil Bank with holdings of 83% by receiving ex-Japanese shares of
Hankook Heungup Bank along with the ownership of almost half of 4 major commercial
banks. Samsung Group bought machines for Cheil Industries with $600,000 from FOA
and received construction and facilities funds of 58.3 million Won from the KDB.  Cheil
Jedang purchased raw sugar with ‘Special Foreign Currency Loans”and expanded
construction with the ICA relief funds. Throughout the 1950s, the Samsung Group’s
total loans amounted to 5.3 billion KW, which put it fourth in amount borrowed among
all Chaebols. Meanwhile, Samsung Group provided 6.4 billion KW to political parties
and after the coup d’etat the size of redemption of illicit wealth forcefully allotted by
military regime was 8 billion Korean Won, which was the second after Taechang
Textile.44) In 1958, further, the Samsung Group acquired Chosun Tire Engineering and
established Hankook Tire.
The Samsung Group followed an import substitution strategy and received government
supports to establish Cheil Jedang and Cheil Industries. Cheil Jedang received $180,000
from the government and financed fiscal shortages with loans from Sangkong Bank
(recently Hanil Bank). In April 1954, only 6 months after the start of business,
government demand, particularly for blankets and garments rapidly, sky rocketed,
pushing the Group to double production facilities.45) Tellingly, in its first year of
production of combed yarn for the public and military consumption, Cheil Industries
44) The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (1963), p.469.
45) Cheil Jedang Inc., Thirty Years’Cheil Jedang (1983), Chapter 2.
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lacked the experience and production quality to spawn increased demand; and as such,
the firm ended the year in debt. By the second year, Cheil Industries had improved its
production quality enough to end the year with a financial surplus. Still, the
government’s decision to ban the import of combed yarn products in the 1950s gave
Cheil Industries a near monopoly that was bound to turn a profit at some point.46)
However, right after the coup d’etat, the Samsung Group was classified as illicitly
accumulated enterprises, Lee Byung-chul persuaded Park Chung Hee and acquired
“Investment Order”, which was a political compromise that Park forgave chaebols for
illicit accumulation of wealth and chaebols promised to support Park’s regime in
return.47) Chaebols were able to actively participate in economic development plans and
the government’s export oriented strategy. The Samsung case also supports the
argument that economic factors and business capability were related more strongly than
purely political factors for Chaebols’growth.
Ⅵ. Conclusion: Continuity and Discontinuity of Korean Chaebols
The Korean War provided enough new market demand for the emersion of Korea’s
chaebols. During and after the War, disposal of ex-Japanese enterprises, relief funds,
government reserved dollar allocations and bank finance loans provided the grounds for
the formation of Chaebols. In the mid-1950s, large conglomerates calcified into
bureaucratic and predatory Chaebols, focusing on an import substitution growth model
based on consumer products.  
In light of the fact that some 40% of large companies were ex-Japanese enterprises in
1950, the argument can be put forward that Korea’s Chaebols were the fruits of
continuations from the colonial era. We must temper this argument, however, with this:
the War destroyed most of these companies, and they were rebuilt in the War’s
aftermath with relief funds and loans. Therefore, continuity cannot be discussed only
with consideration of ex-Japanese enterprises. Additionally, by the end of 1950, many of
these companies were liquidated owing to management failures, and most business
leaders were newly emerging capitalists with little to no experience leading large-scale
firms during the Japanese colonial regime. 
In addition, if we are inclined to focus exclusively on rent seeking and political ties
which were predatory and political for the successes of Korea’s Chaebols, we will
46) Cheil Industries Inc., Forty Years’Cheil Mozik (1994), pp.134-149.
47) Lee Byung-chul (1986), p.121.
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overlook the more pertinent long-term causes for the Chaebols continued growth well
into the 1960s. Hence, the need to couple the Chaebols rent seeking behaviors with their
growing abilities to utilize and maximize productivity. From such a vantage point, a
number of patterns regarding the rise and fall of Chaebols emerge: 1) contrary to
general assumption, political factors are neither the sole nor majority cause for the
growth of these Chaebols; rather, their growth owes largely to economic and monetary
principles, namely stability and growth policies and flexible production and innovation
chains; 2) it is hyperbole to argue that the political regime change with the May 16th
coup d’etat caused many otherwise sound Chaebols to fold. Analysis into the ones that
did fold tells of these firms’over exposure to bad debts, increasing deficits and failures
to find new areas of business into which to grow; and finally, thus, 3) the emergence of
Korean Chaebols originates in the 1950s in the War’s aftermath and the developmental
trajectory of Chaebols is characterized by an economic factor- pulled continuity rather
than a political factor-pushed discontinuity.
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